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Irish and British Electricity Prices: What 
Recent History Implies for Future Prices1 
*Paul Deane (UCC), John FitzGerald, Laura Malaguzzi Valeri,  
Aidan Tuohy (EPRI) and Darragh Walsh 
This paper investigates wholesale and retail electricity prices in Ireland and Great 
Britain between 2008 and 2011, focusing on structural, technological and 
regulatory drivers of price differences. We determine how these factors are likely 
to affect future electricity prices, taking account of the move to increase the 
deployment of renewables and of the EU’s drive to integrate electricity markets 
through the Target Model.  
 
Ireland and Northern Ireland are part of the Single Electricity Market (SEM), a 
compulsory pool system, where generators bid in their energy costs, and receive 
capacity payments reflecting their availability. This provides a transparent market 
(most of the market data are published) and delivers returns to generators that 
approximate the long-run cost of generating.  
 
The British electricity system is governed by the British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements (BETTA) and is based on bilateral contracts. BETTA 
consists of firms that are, for the most part, vertically integrated and therefore 
have both a generating and a retail function. Because most of the transactions 
occur between (and within) firms at prices that are not public, wholesale prices in 
Great Britain (GB) are not transparent.  
 
We first estimate true costs and prices for the British market. The wholesale costs 
of BETTA are estimated through the simulation model PLEXOS that commits and 
dispatches generating plants optimally. Wholesale prices are derived from 
published balancing price information and information on the price of electricity 
futures. 
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Our findings strongly suggest that the wholesale price in Great Britain is much 
lower than in Ireland. We argue that the difference between wholesale prices in 
SEM and BETTA is not driven by technological factors and that the BETTA 
wholesale price is, in fact, too low to cover long run generation costs. The BETTA 
model is thus not a sustainable long-term model. 
 
Our analysis shows that firms in BETTA are not making losses due to the low 
wholesale price, as they are compensated by large retail margins. This favours 
incumbents with established customer bases and makes entry of new generators 
difficult. 
 
We also estimate that the cost of supporting renewables per megawatt hour of 
electricity consumed is much higher in GB than in Ireland, even though 
renewables account for a smaller share of overall consumption. 
 
In the SEM there has been extensive new entry resulting in significant 
construction of thermal generating plants without ad-hoc intervention by the 
regulatory authorities. In BETTA, on the other hand, there has been a dearth of 
new thermal plants coming on line. In fact special provision had to be made to 
ensure new investment in a nuclear plant at Hinkley Point to maintain sufficient 
capacity. To encourage new generating plants to come on board, incentives for 
investment in BETTA must grow, suggesting that the gap between SEM and 
BETTA wholesale prices will narrow in the future. Some form of remuneration for 
capacity seems inevitable.  However, this does not imply that retail prices will 
have to increase in equal proportion.  Our analysis indicates that total electricity 
prices in BETTA are sufficient (or close to being sufficient) to remunerate all 
aspects of providing electricity, but currently all the profits are extracted at the 
retail stage. 
 
The GB market could (and should) be restructured to allow generators to be fairly 
remunerated for their costs while simultaneously decreasing retail margins to 
avoid overburdening final consumers.  It is difficult to envisage how this can be 
achieved without changing a system that is currently based on vertically 
integrated firms, bilateral contracts and limited regulation. The example of the 
SEM shows that strong regulatory oversight can work well with appropriately 
structured liberalised markets. 
 
Upward pressure on prices is likely in the future in both jurisdictions, as both aim 
to increase the share of renewables in electricity generation. Ireland remunerates 
renewables with a feed in tariff, resulting in lower subsidy costs when compared 
to the system of renewable obligation certificates used historically in GB. As GB 
moves towards its own system of feed in tariffs, the disparity in subsidy costs 
across jurisdictions should gradually reduce in size.  
